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Abstract
We present a model of imperfect price competition where not all rms can sell to all consu-
mers. A network structure models the local interaction of rms and consumers. We nd that
aggregate surplus is maximized with a fully connected network, which corresponds to perfect
competition, and decreases monotonically as the network becomes less connected until rms
become local monopolists. When we study which networks are likely to form in equilibrium,
we nd that stable networks are not fully connected but are connected enough to rule out
local monopolists. Our results extend to oligopolistic competition when consumers can either
buy from a single rm or from all rms.
Keywords: Network markets, price competition, oligopoly competition, Bertrand competi-
tion.
JEL Classication: D43, D85, L11, L13.
Resumen
Presentamos un modelo de competencia imperfecta donde no todas las empresas pueden
venderle a todos los consumidores. Usamos un modelo de red para modelar la estructura de
interacciones locales entre empresas y consumidores. Encontramos que el bienestar total se
maximiza cuando la red est a completamente conectada, lo cual corresponde a competencia
perfecta, y se reduce mon otonamente a medida que se eliminan conexiones hasta que las
empresas se vuelven monopolios locales. Cuando estudiamos cu ales redes se forman en equi-
librio encontramos que las redes estables no est an completamente conectadas pero est an lo
sucientemente conectadas para descartar que existan monopolios locales. Nuestros resulta-
dos se extienden a competencia oligopol stica cuando los consumidores s olo pueden comprar
a una empresa o a todas las empresas.
Palabras Clave: Mercados de redes, competencia en precios, competencia oligopol stica,
competencia de Bertrand.
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Networks have become popular to model markets where buyers can only purchase from
some (but not all) sellers. These models seek to understand how the structure of possible
transactions in
uences prices and welfare, as well as studying how market incentives shape
the structure of the network.
Current network models for markets are still striving to nd a balance between modeling
a realistic description of the market while at the same time keeping the models tractable for
complicated network structures. In this paper we model the market through a standard de-
centralized mechanism: Bertrand price competition. We nd that aggregate surplus is only
maximized when the network is fully connected, which corresponds to perfect competition,
and decreases monotonically as the network becomes less connected. The maximum inef-
ciency occurs when rms become monopolists over separate components of the network.
This contrasts with previous models of networks which nd that the allocation is always
ecient conditional on the structure of the network.1
The two seminal papers in the literature are Kranton and Minehart (2001) and Corominas-
Bosch (2004). Kranton and Minehart use a stylized ascending-bid auction where markets
sequentially clear for sub-components of the network. Although similar in spirit to the
idea of a Walrasian auctioneer, it's hard to see how this mechanism could be decentralized.
Corominas-Bosch instead uses an alternating-oer bargaining protocol, but she requires that
proposals be announced simultaneously by all members on each side of the market, which
also implies some sort of centralization in the price setting process.
Both papers reach dierent conclusions about which networks are likely to form in equi-
librium. Kranton and Minehart nd that networks are guaranteed to be ecient, while
Corominas-Bosch nds that networks tend to be over-connected. We nd that stable net-
works are underconnected relative to the ecient network structure.2
Key for our results is the presence of locked-in consumers: consumers who can only
purchase from a single rm. Without locked-in consumers, sellers always play the standard
Bertrand strategies, the allocation is always ecient and the details of the network structure
don't matter. This is a corollary of an important result by Byford (2007) in a setting closely
related to ours. His result is strong because it can apply to any subset of sellers in any
network. To be precise, take any subset S such that all buyers connected to a seller in S
1See Kranton and Minehart (2001), Corominas-Bosch (2004), Blume et al. (2007) and Elliot (2010).
2Except if the cost of connecting members is high. As we discuss below, if a regulator knows the rms'
costs and connecting the network is costly, it would prefer to regulate prices and mandate that the network
become less connected.
1are also connected to at least one other seller in S. Byford then shows that the sellers in S
always post a price equal to marginal cost.3 For Byford's condition to hold, it's necessary
that no seller in S has locked-in consumers. And if there are no locked-in consumers at all,
S equals the entire set of sellers.
Another paper similar in spirit to ours is Nava (2010), who studies quantity (Cournot)
competition on networks where the 
ow of goods is endogenous. In contrast to our model,
he nds that adding links might decrease the aggregate surplus and that sellers prot from
being able to discriminate in the price they charge to their buyers.
Our model is closely related to Varian's model of sales, but his main objective was to
study pricing patterns when some consumers where informed and some were not, and hence,
focused on a symmetric model.4 We wish to relate prices and welfare to dierent network
structures.
After solving the pricing game for a xed network, we study which networks are likely
to form. To do so we analyze a series of entry games where rms decide to form links with
consumers. We nd that stable networks are partially connected. Firms create do create
links to compete over some consumers, but refrain from creating enough links to fully connect
the network. Since price competition is very aggressive, rms decrease their aggressiveness
by refraining from forming links to all consumers.
Most of our results are based on a model of duopoly competition because it's hard to
get tractable results with more rms. We view this as a useful benchmark to clarify the
results of other network models. As we show in Section 4, our results extend to oligopoly
competition as long as consumers can only buy from either one rm or all rms.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 sets up the basic duopoly model;
Section 2.1 solves an example of competition on a road network which contains most of the
intuition for solving the model; Section 2.2 solves for the unique Nash equilibrium of the
duopoly model; Section 2.3 does comparative static exercises for welfare; Section 2.4 analyzes
what would change if we allow for price-discrimination; Section 3 analyzes which networks
are likely to form; Section 4 extends the results to oligopolistic competition; and Section 5













Figure 1: Consumer C1 can only buy from Firm 1, C2 can only buy from F2; and a C1;2 can
buy from any rm.
2 The Duopoly Model
Our model has a nite number consumers and two rms, labeled F1 and F2. Firms and
consumers are represented by nodes on a network. (See Figure 1.) Let C1 denote the
number of consumers who can buy only from Firm 1, C2 the number who can buy only
from F2, and C1;2 the number who can buy from both. Consumers must be linked to a rm
to be able to buy its product or service.
For now, we assume the network structure is exogenously determined before any trans-
actions are carried out and is common knowledge between the players. We will discuss how
the network is formed in Section 3.
We refer to the C1 and C2 consumers as locked-in consumers and to the C1;2 as mobile
consumers. We label the rms such that Firm 1 has weakly more locked-in consumers:
C1 > C2.
Consumers buy at most one item and have a value that is private information. Products
from dierent rms are perfect substitutes. Values are drawn independently from a common
distribution function. Let Q(p) be the probability that a consumer has a value higher or
equal to p. That is, Q is dened over [0;1) ! [0;1] and is decreasing. We assume Q
is dierentiable. For tractability, we assume that Q(p)   pQ0(p) has the single-crossing
condition, as dened below.
Q(p)   pQ
0(p) crosses zero once and from above.
A sucient condition to have the single-crossing condition is that Q has a decreasing
elasticity (it is log-concave) and that the monopolist's problem has a well dened solution
(i.e. Q(p)   pQ0(p) crosses zero at least once). This assumption simplies the proof and
3Byford shows this for pure strategy Nash equilibria, but his proof can be extended to mixed strategy
equilibria.
4See Varian (1981).
3the equilibrium pricing strategies, but is not essential. To get some intuition on why it is
useful, we note that in equilibrium rms face a trade-o between decreasing the rents they
extract from the locked-in consumers and increasing the probability they sell to the mobile
consumers. The single-crossing condition ensures any decrease in price decreases the revenue
from the locked-in consumers, so the trade-o is present over the entire relevant price range.
Firms engage in Bertrand competition. They simultaneously announce prices they will
charge to any consumer who buys their product. Firms cannot price discriminate. (We relax
this in Section 2.4.) Consumers rst observe all prices and then, with probability Q(p), chose
to buy from the cheapest rm that's linked to them. They randomize equally across rms
in case of a tie. Firms can quote any non-negative price. To nd equilibria we need to allow
rms to play a mixed strategy.
Denition 1. A mixed strategy pricing scheme for Firm j is a distribution function
j(p) : [0;1) ! [0;1].
Firms maximize their expected prots, which we label j. A subscript  j denotes the
rm who is not j. In the oligopoly section it denotes all rms that are not j. We assume
rms have a constant marginal cost for selling their products which we normalize to zero.















To solve the game we look for Nash equilibria. Because the behavior of consumers is
trivially captured by Q(p), we focus on the strategies for the rms.
Denition 2. A Nash Equilibrium of the pricing game is a strategy prole, (1;2), such
that no player j can deviate to an alternative mixed strategy 0





j 6= j;8j 2 f1;2g
We denote equilibrium strategies by a star superscript, (
1;
2), and denote by (
1;
2)
the corresponding expected prots.
Next we develop an example to preview how to highlight the results of the paper. Those
interested in going directly to the solution of the model can skip to Section (2.2).
42.1 An example
Two consumers, A and B, wish to cross a river to go to an Irish pub. To do so, they must
cross through one of two available bridges. Each bridge is independently operated by a rm
that charges a toll to any consumer who wishes to cross. Consumers are willing to pay up
to 1 to cross the river. The only cost they incur is that of the toll. That is
Q(p) =
(
1 if p 6 1
0 if not
An exogenous road network limits the choice of bridges for each consumer. For example,
in Figure (4), Consumer A can only cross through the bridge operated by F1 while Consumer
B can choose to cross through any bridge. Firms simultaneously post their tolls (prices).
After observing them consumers choose which bridge to cross, if any.
In the Monopolistic Network, Figure (2), each rm knows it has a monopoly and quotes











The Competitive Network, Figure (3), is a standard Bertrand competition game where











In the Mixed Case Network, Figure (4), F1 has a locked-in consumer, CA, from where it
can extract all the valuation by charging p1 = 1. Alternatively it can try to compete against
F2 for the mobile consumer, CB, at the cost of reducing the price charged to its locked-in
consumer. No pure strategy Nash equilibrium exists in this game: if any rm charges a
positive price, at least one of the two rms would want to charge slightly lower price. If
both rms charged zero, F1 could protably deviate to charging 1, extracting all the surplus
of its locked-in consumer. This same logic rules out pure strategy equilibria in our duopoly
model.
5The Irish Pub 88
pppppppppppp gg






Figure 2: (The Monopolistic Network) Each Firm is a monopoly in their local market
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Figure 3: (The Competitive Network) A network with perfect competition






Figure 4: (The Mixed Case Network) An intermediate case
6In this network, there is unique a mixed strategy equilibrium, as described below.
F1 : Post p = 1 with probability 1
2. With probability 1











F2 : Price according to:
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From the example we can see that rms are not always better o by having access to
more consumers. In the Mixed Case Network, Firm 2 receives a payo strictly larger than
in the Competitive Network. Adding a link from F2 to CA increases the competition and
reduces prots.
Equilibrium strategies for our duopoly model are qualitatively similar to those in the
example. Firm 1 quotes the price that maximizes its monopoly payos with a discrete
probability and both rms mix continuously over prices below. We now proceed to solve the
model.
2.2 Solving the Duopoly Model
Let's return to analyzing an arbitrary network with two rms and any number of consumers.
To solve the model it is useful to derive two useful properties from the single-crossing condi-
tion. First, there exists a unique price, pM, that maximizes revenue from locked-in consumers.
Second, decreasing the price in the range below pM monotonically decreases the revenue from
locked-in consumers.





This price is independent of Cj. Furthermore, for any prices p;p0 such that p < p0 6 pM, p0
yields a higher revenue than p.
7Proof. By the single-crossing condition we know the derivative of the objective function
crosses zero only once and from above. Call pM the value where it crosses zero. This is the
unique maximum and does not depend on Cj, which is only a scale factor. Furthermore, for
values below pM, the derivative is positive, so any decrease in the price decreases revenues.
Therefore revenue increases monotonically until it reaches its maximum.
A direct implication of Proposition 3 is that any price above pM is strictly dominated:
decreasing the price to pM would strictly increase the revenue from the locked-in consumers
and would weakly increase the probability of winning the mobile consumers.
Proposition 4 shows that there are no pure strategy Nash equilibria except for two extreme
cases. One is the standard Bertrand competition which corresponds to C1 = C2 = 0; the
other is when each rm is a separate monopolist, C1;2 = 0.
Proposition 4. There is no pure strategy equilibria for the model with C1 > 0 and C1;2 > 0.
Proof. A pure strategy equilibrium with a positive price can be ruled out by the standard
Bertrand argument as follows. First, take a strategy prole (pj;p j) such that p j < pj 6
pM. Player  j would wish to deviate to pricing arbitrarily closer to pj. Second, assume
pj = p j > 0, then any player could charge an arbitrarily smaller price obtaining a discrete
gain from avoiding the probability of a tie while charging essentially the same price. Finally,
assume (pj;p j) = (0;0), then F1 could deviate to extracting a positive prot by quoting pM
and selling to its locked-in consumers.
We therefore look for mixed strategy nash equilibria. Proposition 5 solves for the unique
equilibrium.
Proposition 5. There is a unique equilibrium of the game. Its associated payos are






For p < pM, rms mix according to











. Firm 2 charges pM with probability 0.
Proof. See Appendix (A).
82.3 Welfare
We can use the payos in Proposition 5 to do comparative statics on welfare by changing
the number of consumers. Firm 1's payo does not depend on the size of the mobile market,
C1;2, nor on the size of Firm 2's locked-in market, C2. F1 gets a prot which is exactly
the same as if it extracted the monopoly surplus from its locked-in consumers. F1 does sell
to the mobile consumers with a positive probability, but since in equilibrium F1 must be
indierent between quoting the monopoly price and quoting prices below, any increase in
expected sales must be exactly oset by the decrease in price.
Firm 2 has a prot that is strictly increasing the number of its locked-in consumers
and strictly increasing in the number of mobile consumers, C1;2. Its prots are also strictly
increasing in the number of locked-in consumers Firm 1 has, because a larger C1 makes Firm
1 less aggressive, which is benecial for Firm 2. Firm 2's prots are smaller than those of








With strict inequality whenever C1 > C2 and C1;2 > 0, respectively.
Every consumer is weakly better o by any increase in the number of mobile consumers,
C1;2, because the distribution of prices shifts downwards. The old distribution rst-order
stochastically dominates the new distribution.
Aggregate surplus is maximized by equating demand to marginal cost. Because of we
normalized marginal cost to zero this is equivalent to producing to fulll all demand. Higher
prices create deadweight loss. Therefore increasing C1;2 also increases aggregate surplus.
2.4 Price Discrimination
Firms prefer not to be able to price-discriminate between mobile and locked-in consumers. If
both rms could discriminate in prices, prots from the mobile consumers would completely
dissipate. F1 is indierent between being able to discriminate or not, but F2 strictly prefers
not to be able. If there were an arbitrarily low cost to be able to discriminate, F1 would also
prefer it were not possible.
To be clear, each rm would wish to be able to discriminate if the other rm could not.
If a rm is the only one with the ability to discriminate, it can compete for the mobile
consumers without sacricing any rents from its locked-in consumers. The discriminating
rm would get the same prot from the mobile consumers as Firm 2 in our duopoly model
with C2 = 0. The rm's total prot would be that plus the monopoly rents from its locked-in
9consumers. As long as the other rm had some locked-in consumers, the discriminating rm
would get a positive gain from this.
The table below summarizes this. All payos have to multiplied by pMQ(pM). The table
is not symmetric for the case where both rms cannot price-discriminate because Firm 2 is
able to compete more aggressively.
Equilibrium Payos F2 can discriminate F2 cannot discriminate
F1 can discriminate C1,C2 C1 + C2
C1;2
C2+C1;2, C2





The table is not necessarily a game that rms play. Whether price discrimination is
possible or not, and how costly it would be to implement, depends on the application at
hand. For example, in the bridge example it might not be cost-eective to identify the
geographical origin of each driver when a large number of them is crossing at rush hour.
3 Which networks are likely to form?
Our analysis up to now has taken the network as given. Given that the network structure
can have a big in
uence on welfare it is important to know which networks are more likely
to arise. To do so we will proceed in two dierent ways.
We will rst ignore the precise protocol of how links are formed and look for a solution
from cooperative game theory. We will look for networks that are pairwise-stable with
respect to the payos induced by the pricing game. We nd that stable networks are always
between the two extreme cases of networks with local monopolists and networks with perfect
competition.
We will next analyze two \entry" games where we precisely specify how and when rms
can form links. These games will consist of two stages, an entry stage and a pricing stage.
The network will be determined at the entry stage and will be xed during the pricing stage.
The pricing stage will correspond exactly to our pricing model. It will turn out that the
equilibria of the entry game are a subset of the pairwise-stable networks.
Entry games are more than a device to understand which networks are likely to form.
They are interesting in their own right and have a long tradition in game-theoretic models of
10industrial organization.5 Their aim is to understand under what circumstances and by what
actions, if any, an incumbent rm can credibly deter competitors from entering its market.
The entry games considered here are dierent from the traditional ones because entry
can be partial: we allow rms to establish links with some consumers without having to
grant access to all consumers in the incumbent's niche.
3.1 Pairwise-stable networks
Fix the total number of consumers,6 for a given network we ask if a rm has an incentive
to add or delete links to the existing consumers. By adding and deleting links, rms change
the network. The payo for a rm from a network will be its expected payo of the pricing
game that would be carried out under such a network. When we say rms have incentives
to add or delete links, we are doing a comparative statics across the payos from dierent
networks in our pricing model. We assume there is no cost to forming links. Unlinked
rms and consumers get a payo of zero. We want to characterize all the networks that are
pairwise-stable.
Denition 6 (Pairwise-stable Networks). A network is pairwise-stable if :
1. No disconnected rm-consumer pair can become linked and increase the payo of both
members.
2. No rm or consumer can delete one of their links and increase their individual payo.
The Competitive Network of the tollway example we analyzed in Section 2.1 was not
pairwise-stable. Any rm could increase its prot by deleting a link. Both the Monopolistic
Network and the Mixed Network were pairwise stable, even though Firm 2 receives a strictly
smaller payo in the later. This because Firm 1 has no strict incentive to add or remove the
link that connects it to Consumer B.
Only the rms' incentives determine if a network is pairwise-stable because adding a link
between any rm and any consumer increases the expected payo for all consumers.
Firms would never want to delete links to their locked-in consumers and would always
want to add a link to consumers that are not linked to the other rm.
5Tirole (1988) is the required reference.
6This is one of the only parts of the paper where the fact that the number of consumers are integers
matters. Multiplying the number of all consumers by a constant does not change the strategic incentives.
Thus, allowing the number of consumers to be a continuous variable can be thought as an approximation to
large numbers of consumers with some adequate rescaling.
11Firm 1 is always indierent between adding links or not to consumers that are linked
to Firm 2. This would only increase C1;2 and decrease C2 by one, but would not aect its
equilibrium payos.
Firm 2 would have an incentive to add a link to a consumer of type C1 if and only if:
C2 + C1;2 + 1 < C1
That is, only if F2's potential consumers are not larger than Firm 1's locked-in market
after the links are added.
Except for integer constraints, Firm 2 would want to increase its links at low levels
of C1;2 (i.e. for those with C2 < C1) but would want to decrease them at high levels
(C2 > C1). In this sense, pairwise-stable networks are bounded away from the networks with
local monopolists and from those with perfect competition.
3.2 Entry Game 1
Suppose Firm 1 is the incumbent and initially has links with all potential consumers. Firm
2 enters by forming links with the consumers. It can decide to form any number of links.
After Firm 2 makes its decision, the network is xed and the pricing game is played out.








(C1   E) + E
Where E is the level of entry measured by the number of links formed to enter.
Using the results in Section 3.1 we know that Firm 2 would continue to add links while
the following condition holds:




Therefore Firm 2 would stop forming links much before it takes away all of Firm 1's
locked-in market, to keep Firm 1 from being too aggressive in the subsequent pricing game.
Roughly speaking it would only enter half of the potential market.
A similar eect has been previously shown in the entry games literature. It was labeled by
Fudenberg and Tirole (1984) as the \fat cat eect". The \fat cat eect" refers to a situation
of strategic over-investment in capital by the incumbent rm to act less aggressive conditional
on an entry it knows it cannot deter. The eect is also present in the multi-market oligopoly
12model of Bulow et al. (1985).
Our focus on the entry stage is dierent than the previous models where the incumbent
chose to be a \fat cat" by over-investing in capital. In our model it's the entrant who choses
to keep the incumbent as a \fat cat" by only entering partially.
Would Firm 1, given a chance, wish to delete links to its initial consumers to accommodate
Firm 2 in better terms? Could it perhaps even deter entry by sustaining a \lean and hungry"
stance described by Fudenberg and Tirole (1984)? The answer is no. Suppose Firm 1
preemptively broke C2 links, Firm 2 would form links to any unlinked consumer and then
continue to form links while the following condition holds.





Firm 1 ends up with the same amount of locked-in consumers regardless of how many
links it initially deletes.7 Since Firm 1's payo only depends on this amount, it would never
wish to break links to accommodate Firm 2.
3.3 Entry Game 2
Suppose now that initially Firm 1 and Firm 2 have two separate monopolies. That is, at the
initial stage there are only locked-in consumers. We keep the convention that Firm 1 starts
out as the dominant rm: C1 > C2. The game starts with an entry stage where rms are
allowed to simultaneously form links with consumers in the other rms locked-in market.
Once all links are formed, the network is xed and the pricing game is carried out.
This could be the case of two separate regional monopolies held in place by a restriction
to sell across borders. The entry stage occurs after a free trade agreement lifts restrictions
across borders, but rms still have to decide in which locations across the border they want
to open a point of sale. It could also represent two similar products that in the pre-entry
stage could not reach the same consumers because of regulation or technological restrictions.
This happened in the phone and cable service markets where technological advances allowed
cable providers to supply phone services and vice-versa, although companies still had the
ability to decide in which regions they would operate.
In the entry stage, rms simultaneously announce the number of links they will form
with the other rm's locked-in consumers. This announcement is their level of entry. We
seek to nd how many links each rm would form in a Nash equilibrium.
7Unless Firm 1 broke links with more than half its locked-in consumers, in which case it would have an
even smaller payo!















Where the Integer function maps intervals to the set of integers inside that interval.
Proof. Their prots from a strategy prole (E1;E2) are 1(E1;E2) as described below.
1(E1;E2) =
(
(C1   E2)pMQ(pM); if C2   E1 6 C1   E2
(C2   E1)
C1+E1





C1+E1pMQ(pM); if C2   E1 6 C1   E2
(C2   E1)pMQ(pM) if C2   E1 > C1   E2
First we rule out any strategy prole that makes Firm 2 the dominant rm after entry.
Assume we have an equilibrium such that:
C2   E1 > C1   E2
This can only be an equilibrium if Firm 1 sets E1 = 0. For this strategy Firm 2's best
response is Integer[
C1 C2
2 ], which is not enough to make Firm 2 the dominant rm after
entry. This is a contradiction. We conclude there are no equilibria where this happens.

















Firm 2 enters partially in any equilibrium. The level of entry is always low enough such
that Firm 1 still remains the dominant rm after entry. Firm 1 has multiple best responses
but has no strict incentive to enter Firm 2's locked-in market. Doing so does not alter its
payo nor alter Firm 2's strategic incentives. Adding an arbitrarily small cost to forming
links would reduce the set of equilibria to a unique strategy prole where only Firm 2 enters
as described above.
14Consumer surplus and aggregate surplus strictly increase with the partial entry. By
denition, in an entry equilibrium rms have no incentive to change their links. Since
only rms' incentives matter to determine which networks are pairwise stable, equilibrium
networks must necessarily be pairwise stable.
3.4 Regulating the network
If adding links is costly, as is the case for infrastructure networks, it is wasteful to add links
that do not increase the feasible outcomes. If a regulator had perfect information about
Q(p) and about costs, she should mandate that the network be composed of disconnected
monopolies and then set the price equal to the marginal cost.
On the other hand, if it is easier for the regulator to control the connectivity of the
network instead of the price, she should force a connectivity between the rms in excess of
what they would chose to do on their own. Even though rms with low numbers of locked-in
consumers have an incentive to build the infrastructure to partially compete with the other
rms, in equilibrium they do no generate sucient links. The regulator should therefore
force the rms to be more interconnected.
4 Extending the results for oligopolistic competition
For applications it would be useful to extend the model to allow for an arbitrary number of
rms. Unfortunately the model quickly becomes intractable, because the potential types of
consumers include all possible subsets of rms, which grow exponentially.
Here we solve a special case of oligopolistic competition where consumers come in two
types: locked-in consumers who can buy only from one rm and perfectly mobile consumers
who can buy from all rms. We nd that the equilibria are very similar to the duopoly
pricing equilibrium.
There are several applications that t this environment. For example, a situation where
some people are already locked into a specic technology while other people are waiting for
the prices to be determined before they decide which technology to adopt. Small xed-costs
for adopting technology could be easily included in the model. Another pertinent environ-
ment is one where some consumers buy online and can see the all the price information, while
others just go to their local store and cannot react to prices from other rms. A third ap-
plication is treating the network as a model of brand loyalty. Firms face a trade-o between
tendering to completely loyal consumers or competing for extreme price seeking consumers.
15The model we present here is very similar to Varian's model of sales, except that we allow
rms to have dierent amounts of locked-in consumers. This will force the equilibria to be
asymmetric, while Varian focuses on symmetric outcomes.
In this model the competition will only happen between the two most aggressive rms,
those with the lowest opportunity cost for lowering their prices. All other rms will give up
on capturing the mobile market and stay out by setting the monopoly price.
4.1 An arbitrary number of rms competing in a single market
The model we are considering has a nite number J of rms each with some of locked-in
consumers. We label rms such that:
C1 > C2 > ::: > CJ > 0
In addition to their locked-in consumers, all rms can compete to sell in a large global
market that has a number CG of consumers. Consumer values and the pricing game are as
before.
There is always an equilibrium where Firms J and J  1 play as described in the duopoly
model while all other rms price pM. We refer to this pricing behavior as \staying out"
because the equilibrium probability that they will capture the global market is zero. Propo-
sition 8 proves this is an equilibrium.
The intuition behind the proof is that rms face a trade-o between extracting all the
surplus from their locked-in consumers or lowering their price to try to capture the global
consumers. There are two eects that keep rms with more locked-in consumers out. They
face a higher opportunity cost from lowering prices; and if they deviate from the prescribed
equilibrium they have to quote a lower price than all rms who go in to win the global
market. This two forces move in the right direction to sustain the equilibrium.
These strategies turn out to be the unique equilibrium when we assume that only two
rms have the smallest number of consumers. That is, when CJ 2 > CJ 1. This is proven in
Proposition 9. Uniqueness follows because there is a price interval where rms J and J   1
must necessarily mix as in the duopoly model. Because of this higher rms can never be
made indierent between quoting the monopoly price and a lower one.
16Proposition 8. The following strategies always constitute an equilibrium of the oligopoly
model: Firms J   1 and J play as in the duopoly model, all other rms just chose pj = pM
with probability one.
Proof. See Appendix (B).
Proposition 9. If CJ 2 > CJ 1 > CJ, the strategies in Proposition 8 constitute the unique
equilibrium of the game.
Proof. See Appendix (C).
The assumption that CJ 2 > CJ 1 is absolutely necessary for uniqueness. If it fails we
can always construct symmetric equilibria where all rms that have the two lowest values
for Cj enter with positive probability. All these equilibria are payo equivalent. Assuming
CJ 1 > CJ only simplies the proof.
5 Standard network centrality measures are inappro-
priate
Standard measures of network centrality rank positions with more links as being better, but
this is inappropriate in our model. The problem is that standard centrality measures only
use the information on the topology of the network, but do no provide an explicit model for
how agents would exploit their positions to their advantage.
For example, the in-betweenness measure counts all the shortest paths that cross a given
node to measure the centrality of each position.8 The implicit assumption is that the shortest
paths are the cheapest paths and that nodes on the path can extract surplus from agents
who wish to cross their position.
As our model shows, this is clearly inappropriate, because in equilibrium agents try to
extract the maximum surplus from their position, which endogenously determines which
paths are cheaper. Arbitrage considerations pushes the cost of the shortest paths toward
something that should be similar to the cost of alternatives. Therefore, an explicit model of
competition is required to determine the ability of each agent to extract the surplus from
her position.
In our model, the number of links is a deceiving measure of prots. For example, compare
Firm 2 in Figures 3 and 4. Firm 2 has a higher in-betweenness measure in the competitive
8See Jackson (2008) for the denition of this and other centrality measures.
17network, because she has access to more consumers, but the increase in its connectivity is
more than oset by the increase in competition, which drives prots to zero.
The intuition behind the in-betweenness measure is not completely wrong, being on more
paths sometimes is benecial. The problem is that Bertrand competition is very aggressive,
so in our model there is a very real trade-o between connectivity and prots. Therefore, we
need more models with economic foundations to evaluate when centrality measures based
solely on the network topology are appropriate.
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18A Solving for the unique equilibrium of the duopoly
model. Proposition 5.
























j;8p = 2 support(
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j) (2)
The general strategy of the proof is to rst nd the equilibrium support, then nd the
equilibrium payos and then use the mixed strategy indierence condition to pin down the
strategies.
Let pmin be the minimum price Firm 1 is willing to charge if it is guaranteed to sell to










The single-crossing condition guarantees that pmin is unique. The following properties
are useful for the rest of the proof.
- No mixing beyond pM: Firms cannot charge a price above pM with positive proba-
bility. This is true because above this price the marginal revenue from their locked-in
consumers is negative and rms can weakly increase their probability of selling to the
mobile consumers by lowering their price.
- The common support property: The support of each rm's strategies must be the
same. On the contrary, suppose (p0;p00) is in the support of rm j but not of rm  j.
Then Firm j is not maximizing because  j is constant over this interval but pQ(p) is
strictly increasing (by the single-crossing condition). Therefore Firm j could protably
shift probability mass to p00.
- The no gaps below the top property: In equilibrium there cannot be an interval
(p0;p00] with p00 6 pM such that p0 is in the support of the equilibrium strategies but
(p0;p00] is not. Suppose there is such an interval, then j(p0) = j(p00) so  j(p0;
j) <
 j(p00;
j) by the single-crossing condition. This contradicts the fact that p0 is in the
support of the equilibrium strategies.
- The no ties property: Ties cannot occur with positive probability. Ties at a price
19p only happen if both rms have an atom at p. This cannot happen in equilibrium
because any rm could protably deviate to charging arbitrarily below of p, obtaining
a discrete increase in the probability of winning the mobile consumers.
We now continue with the rest of the proof.
Step 1: Firm 2 makes prots above the monopoly rents from her locked-in consumers.
Since Firm 1 would never charge below pmin with a positive probability, Firm 2 can
charge a price arbitrarily close (from below) to pmin and sell to all mobile consumers. From
here we conclude that in equilibrium, Firm 2 has a strictly higher prot than the prot from























Step 2: In equilibrium, Firm 1 has an atom at pM.
From the no ties property and from no mixing beyond pM, we know that limp"pM j(p) = 1
holds for at least one rm . Therefore, from the no gaps property and the common support



















2 > pMQ(pM)C2 it must be that limp"pM 1(p) < 1. We conclude that F1 must have
an atom at pM.
Step 3: The support of the equilibrium strategies is [pmin;pM].
We know pM is the upper bound of the support from the no gaps below the top property
and the no mixing beyond pM property. We also know Firm 1 would never quote a price
below pmin. Since Firm 1 has an atom at pM and there are no ties, her equilibrium payo
is C1Q(pM)pM. If the equilibrium strategies are not mixing in an interval above pmin, Firm
1 could charge a price arbitrarily close (from above) to pmin and get a higher payo. We
conclude that pmin is the lower bound of the support for the equilibrium strategies.
Step 4: Solving for equilibrium.
Since [pmin;pM] is the support of the equilibrium strategies, we know that the mixed
strategy indierence condition must hold with equality over this range, so we only need
to gure out the equilibrium payo to get the equilibrium strategies. Since F1 has an
20atom at pM but F2 does not, we know 
1 = C1pMQ(pM). As argued above, we know




















1(pmin) = 0 and 
2 = pminQ(pmin)(C2 + C1;2). Plugging this into the

















if p < pM
1 if p = pM
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B The equilibrium of the duopoly model is also an
equilibrium of the oligopoly model. Proposition 8.
Proof. Take any p 2 [0;pM]. For each rm we will show that the expected prot from quoting
p is smaller or equal than the equilibrium payo. From the duopoly model, Section 2.2, we
know j(p) 6 
j for rms J and J   1 and for any price p. We want to show the same for





M)[CJ + CG(1   J 1(p))] 6 p
MQ(p
M)CJ
pCG(1   J 1(p)) 6 (p
M   p)CJ
) pCG(1   J 1(p)) 6 (p
M   p)Cj
) pCG(1   J 1(p))(1   J(p)) 6 (p
M   p)Cj
pQ(p






If Cj > CJ 1, the last inequality is strict.
21C The equilibrium of the duopoly model is the unique
equilibrium of the oligopoly model. Proposition 9.
Proof. To prove uniqueness we must use some of the properties of equilibrium strategies we
found for the duopoly model. Below we restate the properties so they apply to the oligopoly
model. The proofs are the same as before.
- Common support: For any price range where a rm is mixing, at least one other
rm must also be mixing.
- No gaps below the top: For any p0 < p00 6 pM with p0 in the support of at least one
rm's strategy, it must be that at least two rms are actively mixing over (p0;p00].
- No ties with positive probability: Firms cannot have atoms below pM and at least
one rm must have limp"pM j(p) = 1. This guarantees that if several rms have an
atom at pM they will not tie for the mobile consumers with positive probability.
Continuing with the proof, rst we show that for a low enough interval, only Firms J
and FirmJ  1 can be actively mixing and do so according to the duopoly strategies. Dene
pmin
j as the unique price that makes Firm j indierent between capturing the mobile market







J 2 6 ::: 6 p
min
1
Since there can't be ties at the top, there is at least one rm who doesn't have an atom
at pM. All other rms must have an expected utility of pMQ(pM)Cj, by the no gaps below
the top property. Since only Firm J would be willing to price in [pmin
J ;pmin
J 1) it can always
guarantee herself a payo higher than its monopoly rents. Therefore it cannot have an atom
at the monopoly price. Firms J and J  1 are the only one who can be mixing in [pmin
J 1;pmin
J 2)
and they must do so according to the duopoly strategies.
Next we show that all other rms strictly prefer to stay out. Let p < pM be a price such
that below p only Firms J and J   1 are actively mixing. We know they must be mixing
with the duopoly strategies. Firms J and J   1 are indierent between charging p and pM.
Since CJ 2 > CJ 1, from the proof in Proposition 8 we verify that all other rms strictly
prefer to charge pM. Therefore the other rms cannot be made indierent between pM and
any price below. We conclude they all stay out with probability one and the strategies in
Proposition 8 are the unique equilibrium.
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